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he impact of administrative costs on the distribution of terminal wealth is approximated using a simple formula applicable to
many investment situations. We show that the reduction in median returns attributable to administrative fees is usually at least
twice the amount of the administrative costs charged for most investment funds, when considering a risk-adjustment correction
over a reasonably long-term time horizon. he example we present covers a number of standard cases and can be applied to
passive investments, mutual funds, and hedge funds. Our results show investors the potential losses they face in performance
due to administrative costs.
1. Introduction and Motivation
he administrative costs of saving and pension schemes have
received increasing attention in recent years, at a time when
a massive shit has been witnessed from actively to passively
managed funds—oten exchange-traded funds (ETFs)—that
incur lower costs. he reason is obvious. Most studies of
the performance of actively managed funds are unable to
demonstrate their higher performance [1–3]. Mutual fund
administrative fees are all expenses levied by a fund on its
investors, covering investment management, administration,
servicing, custody, and accounting services, among others
[4]. OECD [5] recommends the promotion of low-cost
retirement savings investments because of the huge impact
of fee levels in terms of reductions in beneits for long
contribution periods.
In this paper we show that the impact of administrative
costs on terminal wealth can be substantial.We also propose a
simplemethod for comparingmedian returns in the presence
and absence of such costs, holding risk constant, and report
that, for certain investment strategies, administrative fees can
at times be twice as high as returns.Median values as opposed
to expectations are used because the instrument we employ is
the value-at-risk measure (i.e., quantiles).
While a good historical performance has been reported
for a few actively managed funds, it is by no means straight-
forward to prove that this performance is anything but a
random phenomenon (see, among others, [6, 7]). Let us
assume for the time being that many savers want to avoid
incurring additional administrative fees, especially if they are
not certain of a higher performance.
When calculating the consequences of extra costs, a stan-
dard approach is used to employ a deterministic prediction
of expected loss on returns, which is the diference between
the expected returns on terminal wealth with andwithout the
extra administrative costs. his is oten suicient to demon-
strate the impact of administrative fees. A typical calculation,
for example, might show that an additional one percent cost
will mean that a quarter of a saver’s pension disappears. his
paper shows that while such calculations are highly thought
as provoking, theymaywell be overly conservative, given that
the saver may well incur costs greater than one percent. he
diference between the expected returns on terminal wealth
without administrative costs and with them is an estimate
of only part of the impact, because extra costs inluence the
whole distribution of terminal wealth, not only irst-order
moments or location measures. his paper further examines
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this diference and provides a simple analytic expression for
calculating the risk-adjusted impact of administrative costs
on the median returns of terminal wealth. A deterministic
prediction such as the diference between the expected or
median returns of terminal wealth in the presence and
absence of additional administrative costs fails to take the
saver’s risk aversion into account. It is tacitly assumed that the
saver takes the same level of risk with or without these extra
costs. Yet, we know that this is not the whole story. If a saver
loses a quarter of his pension, then he will tend to be more
risk averse with his remainingmoney; he will not want to lose
much more. As such, a pension saver paying one percent in
additional fees will tend to approach risky investments with
more care than a saver who is not being charged these extra
costs—this insight runs contrary to most descriptions in the
literature. Another way of understanding this behaviour is in
terms of a lost opportunity: the saver loses the opportunity to
take riskswith the one percent extra costs that he is apparently
not prepared to lose. Such risky positions, however, give
bettermedian returns than less risky positions. As a result, the
lost opportunity hits hard. We tacitly assume that greater risk
implies better median returns and that greater risk implies
that our risk measure reacts in the “right” direction. We use
a simple quantile as our downside risk measure and we make
the above assumptions explicit in our parameter space.
2. Background
Many authors have studied optimal consumption-investment
problems [8–13]. Performance in terms of stochastic domi-
nance has also been investigated. For instance, Huang et al.
[2] ind that funds that shit risk perform worse than those
that maintain risk levels stable over time. hey conclude that
agency problems account for this behaviour; that is, fund
managers are more interested in strategically shiting their
risk levels to attract additional fund inlows than they are
in concentrating on strategic investment. he authors use
a holdings-based measure that they deine as the diference
between a fund’s current holdings volatility and its past real-
ized volatility. However, the standard deviation of the fund’s
actual return is a poor risk measure (see, for instance, [14])
that treats gains and losses symmetrically. Schuhmacher and
Eling [15] analyze frequently used risk-based performance
measures.
Many authors examine performance but do not focus
on administrative costs [16–19]. Other costs paid by the
investors, such as the price of an interest guarantee on with-
proit policies, have been measured in terms of lost returns
[20]. Cavenaile et al. [21] analyze the impact of illiquidity in
hedge fund returns on their risk-adjusted performance and
diversiication potential. Eling [22] inds diferent levels of
performance persistence in hedge funds, the results depend-
ing on the statistical methodology employed. he need to
account for costs in long-term investments is, however,
implicitly accepted [23, 24]. Costs associated to mortality-
linked funds have been also investigated [25].
When studyingmutual fund administrative fees, Khorana
et al. [4] ind that fees can vary substantially across funds
and from country to country. hey also show that larger
funds tend to charge lower fees. Choi et al. [26] report
that competition has not eliminated high-fee funds and that
fees paid decrease with the inancial literacy of the investor.
Interestingly, subjects who choose high-fee funds feel they are
making amistake. Bergstresser et al. [27] quantify the beneits
that investors purchasing mutual funds enjoy in exchange for
the fees paid to brokers. All these studies serve to motivate
the contribution reported here, that is, a proposal for a simple
tool that can quantify the impact of administrative fees on
performance while taking into account risk adjustment and
long-term time horizons.
For lifetime investors, the importance of performance and
transparency of pension schemes is widely recognized [28–
31]. Small deviations in performance can become massive
as a result of the long-term factor. Pension savers engage
with their retirement savings for long periods of time,
oten over several decades. Current performance evaluation
methods are usually too myopic and overlook persistence in
performance, that is, the role played by time.
3. The Model
We assume a simple price process. Consider a Black-Scholes
inancial market, that is, a market with a constant risk-free
rate of interest � and stock index (��) following a geometric
Brownian motion:
����� = ��� + ����, (1)
where � is the expected return, � is the volatility, and� is a
standard Brownian motion.
Let � denote a wealth process and assume that wealth is
invested at a constant proportion � in stocks and the rest at
the risk-free rate. Assume further that administration costs
are deducted continuously from the wealth process with a
rate of ] proportional to the amount invested in risky assets.
We therefore consider administrative costs (particularly, for
custodial and accounting services) to be given by �]. he
dynamics of� are thus given by
����� = �
����� + (1 − �) ��� − �]��
= ��� + � (� − � − ]) �� + �����.
(2)
he wealth process is a geometric Brownian motion with
the well-known representation:
�� = �0 exp [(� (� − � − ]) + � − 12�2�2) � + ����] . (3)
Assume for ease of notation that �0 ≡ 1. More realistic
conditions, including more general price processes with
variance jumps or distributions with heavier tails, might be
considered in the future. It could be argued that the stock
price dynamics in our models are too simple to capture
long-term efects. However, our aim is to study the model
presented here irst and, at a later date, to check the robustness
of our results in more sophisticated settings. Additionally,
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wealth distributionmay include the present value of pensions
and future social security beneits together with some other
forms of wealth. However, pension wealth is not perfectly
fungible and some other household assets may also have
liquidity constrains. Besides, diferential tax treatment may
also be applicable. Our approach does not consider this more
general framework.
3.1. Quantiles. Since �� D= √��, where � is a standard
normal variate, it follows that the �-percentile, ��,�, in the
distribution of�� is given by
��,� = �� (�, �, �, �, ], �)
= exp [(� (� − � − ]) + � − 12�2�2) � + ��√���] ,
(4)
where �� denotes the �-percentile of a standard normal
distribution.
Speciically, the median is given by
�(�, �, �, �, ], �) = exp [(� (� − � − ]) + � − 12�2�2) �] .
(5)
We deine the (geometric) rate of return
� (�, �, �, �, ]) = � (� − � − ]) + � − 12�2�2, (6)
such that � = exp(��). From (6), we can see that, given �, �,�, and �2 ixed, the rate of return (�) is equal to a constant
minus the administrative costs �].
Note that, even in the absence of administrative costs, the
rate of return is negative for suiciently large values of �.
he expected value of��, E[��] = exp[(�(�−�−])+�)�],
is always increasing in �. his relects the fact that for high
equity exposures the wealth distribution is highly skewed, the
majority of the mass being close to zero and a long right tail.
Given the skewness of the wealth distribution, here we
prefer to compare medians rather than means.
3.2. Parameter Space Restrictions. Our model parameters
are �, �, �, �, � and the quantile level is �. We restrict our
parameter space to those parameters for which the median
increases and the �-percentile decreaseswhen exposure to the
risky asset increases.
he reason why we restrict our parameter space to this
combination is to ensure that our assumptions are realistic.
An increase in the median return is a necessary reward when
downside risk increases in the distribution of ��. hus, we
assume that any risk-averse saver will only increase their
exposure to the risky assets if the median return increases.
We consider this restriction natural. Besides this property, we
only consider nonnegative administrative costs (]). All details
are provided in Appendix A.
Example 1. For illustrative purposes, we present an example
that we discuss in detail in the sections that follow.We use the
capital market parameters � = 4%, � = 8%, and � = 20%. We
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Figure 1:he plot shows ln(��,�)/� as a function of � in our example.
Parameters are � = 4%, � = 8%, � = 20%, ] = 0%, and � = 50%.We
set � = 10% (solid), 5% (dashed), 1% (dotted), and 0.1% (mixed).
also assume that � = 50% is invested in stocks and that ] = 0,
so there are no administrative costs.
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of quantiles over time for
some values of the probability level; that is, � = 10%, 5%, 1%
and 0.1%.We plot ln(��,�)/� so we have amonotonic transfor-
mation of the quantile (log-scale of (4) divided by �).
Figure 1 shows that ln(��,�)/� is negative in the initial
period. Values of ln(��,�)/� measure the loss in the lowest
quantiles and capture the value-at-risk for the worst possible
scenarios of the wealth process. Ater forty years, ln(��,�)/� is
clearly above zero, indicating that initial wealth has increased
even for a situation that is at the 5% level of the downside tail.
In our example, all the conditions of the parameter space
are satisied for a time horizon of less than a hundred years.
4. Constant Risk of Terminal Wealth
Weare interested in studying the efect of administrative costs
on the median rate of return when ixing the level of risk in
thewealth distribution. (A similar procedure could be applied
to evaluate the efect of administrative costs on the expected
rate of return.)he level of risk in the wealth distribution can
be measured by a (low) percentile in the distribution, that is,
a value-at-risk (VaR) measure.
Our procedure for analysing the impact of administrative
costs is based on a constant risk factor. hus, we examine the
case for which we have no administrative fees, ] = 0, and
calculate a risk measure for the distribution of wealth at time�. hen, we determine the equity exposure in the presence
of administrative costs, ] > 0, that corresponds to the same
risk as the given equity exposurewith no administrative costs.
Hence, we seek to ind the reduction in equity exposure,Δ
]
, such that the �-percentile of the wealth distribution
with equity exposure � − Δ
]
and administrative costs ],��(� − Δ ], �, �, �, ], �), matches the �-percentile of the wealth
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distribution with equity exposure � and no administrative
costs ��(�, �, �, �, 0, �).
hus, we seek Δ
]
, such that
�� (� − Δ ], �, �, �, ], �) = �� (�, �, �, �, 0, �) . (7)
According to (4), we obtain the equivalent relation:
((� − Δ
]
) (� − � − ]) + � − 12(� − Δ ])2�2) �
+ (� − Δ
]
) �√���
= (� (� − �) + � − 12�2�2) � + ��√���,
(8)
which ater simple manipulations yields the quadratic equa-
tion:
�Δ2
]
+ �Δ
]
+ � = 0, (9)
where� = �2/2, � = (� − � − ]) − ��2 +���/√�, and � = ]�.
It immediately follows from (A.4) that �2 − 4�� ≥ 0. So,
there is a solution for Δ
]
, and it is given by
Δ
]
= −� − √�2 − 4��2� . (10)
he other root, −(� + √�2 − 4��)/2�, corresponds to
negative equity exposures.
Example 1 (continued). Figure 2 presents our example log-
scale quantile divided by � as a function of � and the
corresponding quantile when there are administrative costs.
he graph shows that the level of investment in stocks � =50% shits to the let if we consider � = 10% and ] =0.1%. his means that when administrative costs exist, an
investment equivalent in terms of our risk measure to one
that has 50% invested in stocks and no administrative costs
has a lower proportion invested in stocks, Δ
]
= 2.38%, for� = 40.
5. Rate of Return
Let �
]
be the rate of return with administrative costs ] and
exposure � − Δ
]
. It follows immediately from (6) that the
diference between the rate of return � and �
]
is given by
� − �
]
= �] + Δ
]
(� − � − ]) + 12Δ2]�2 − �Δ ]�2. (11)
From the deining equation (8), it holds that
�] + Δ
]
(� − � − ]) + 12Δ2]�2 − �Δ ]�2 =
−Δ
]
���√� , (12)
and we therefore arrive at the simple expression:
� − �
]
= −Δ ]���√� . (13)
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Figure 2:he plot shows ln(��,�)/� as a function of � in our example,
where � = 40. Parameters are � = 4%, � = 8%, � = 20%, and� = 10%. We compare ] = 0% (solid) with ] = 0.1% (dotted).
he horizontal dotted line indicates the value of ln(�0.1,40)/40 when� = 50% and ] = 0%.
In (13), as �� is negative, the reduction in the rate of return
is positive. Given our assumptions, it is not surprising that
the inclusion of administrative costs brings a reduction in
the geometric rate of return (note that the geometric rate of
return is based on the median of the wealth distribution) for��. However, note that Δ ] depends on �. As a consequence,
the reduction in the rate of return attributable to administra-
tive costs does not necessarily tend to zero as � increases. In
certain speciic cases, it might be constant, but in general it is
increasing in �.
In order to understand expression (13) we need to ind a
simple irst-order approximation.his should enable us to see
the dependence of � − �
]
on � or its rate of convergence to a
constant as a function of �.
5.1. First-Order Taylor Expansion of Lost Rate of Return. Our
aim is to examine the behaviour of the reduction in the rate
of return as a function of ]. We derive a second-order Taylor
expansion of Δ
]
at ] = 0. Since by deinition Δ 0 = 0 we have
Δ
]
= �Δ ]�]
��������]=0] +
12 �
2Δ
]�]2
���������]=0]
2 + � (]2) . (14)
Diferentiating (12) with respect to ] yields
(� − Δ
]
) + �Δ ]�] (� − �) + Δ ] �Δ ]�] �2
− �Δ ]�] ��2 = −
(�Δ
]
/�]) ���√� ,
(15)
and by inserting ] = 0 and rearranging the terms, we obtain
�Δ
]�]
��������]=0 =
�
− (� − �) + ��2 − ���/√� . (16)
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Similarly, by diferentiating (12) twice and inserting ] = 0
we obtain
�2Δ
]�]2
���������]=0 =
�2(�Δ
]
/�]����]=0)2− (� + �) + ��2 − ���/√�
= � (��2 − 2 (− (� − �) + ��2 − ���/√�))(− (� − �) + ��2 − ���/√�)3 .
(17)
Using (13) and ater a few more simple manipulations, it
follows that
� − �
]
= −Δ ]���√�
≈ −( �Δ ]�]
��������]=0] +
12 �
2Δ
]�]2
���������]=0]
2) ���√�
= ]�� + 12 �
2Δ
]�]2
���������]=0
���√� ]2,
(18)
where
� = 11 + (((� − �) /�) − ��)√�/�� . (19)
From these expressions, the irst- and second-order
efects of ] can be seen on the reduction in the rate of return.
Note that our chosen parameter space insures that � is
positive and strictly larger than 1. he term (((� − �)/�) −��)√�/�� is negative and larger (see (A.3), where �� is
negative, because � < 50%) than −1.
An interesting feature of our irst-order approximation to
the lost rate of return � − �
]
is
� − �
]
≈ �]�. (20)
So, we can concentrate on �, which is a multiplier, to
obtain a simple, easy-to-use, irst-order approximation of the
impact of administrative costs (�]) on the lost rate of return.
Moreover, we note that � tends to one as � decreases, but
depending on the parameters and in the medium horizon of�, � can be quite large, as becomes evident in the illustrations
presented in the next section. So, whenmeasuring the impact
of administrative costs in terms of the multiplier �, which is
larger than 1, we see that it can grow rapidly. (he second-
order efect is in the same direction.) According to (20) we
also see that for analyzing the efect of administrative costs
on the median rate of return it is necessary to ix the level of
risk factors. For illustration, Example 1 uses diferent values of
the probability level �; namely, � = 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1%.
Additionally, the values of �, �, �, ], and � also need to be
ixed, according to realistic scenarios for generic investment
products. In Section 6, parameter values for low, medium,
and high volatility scenarios are proposed and used in the
illustration of the impact of administrative costs.
5.2. First-Order Approximation of the Opportunity Cost. We
turn now to concentrate on � and think of this multiplier as a
way of assessing the impact of administrative costs on the rate
of return lost in a feasible time horizon for investing. When� > 1 we can formally deine the opportunity cost up to irst-
order as
��� = � − 1 = − (((� − �) /�) − ��)√�/��1 + (((� − �) /�) − ��)√�/��
= − (� − � − ��2)���/√� + (� − � − ��2) .
(21)
We see that ��� depends on the risk premium (� − �) and
is increasing with the percentile �, because when � increases
then �� increases. Note again that since we concentrate on
downside risk, we take � < 50%, and then �� is negative. he
opportunity cost also depends on the particular combination
of stock exposure � and volatility �2. Additionally, we also
see the interrelations between the opportunity costs ���
and the investment period. hus, the most interesting result
is that the opportunity cost ��� also increases with the
investment period � and can be extremely large when �
increases. Note that, according to Condition 2 in Appendix A
(where the parameter space is deined), the investment period
cannot be ininitely long. he maximum value for � equals
[���/(� − � − ��2)]2 and then the opportunity cost tends to
ininity. Recall that �� is negative.
It is our belief that the size of the opportunity cost has
perhaps been underestimated in the literature to date on the
grounds that it may dilute over time. We have shown that the
opportunity cost depends on the period of investment. his
particular result is of critical importance to pension savers,
who make long-term decisions. We show in the illustrations
that follow in reasonably long-term horizons of forty years
the opportunity cost efect can be quite substantial. Our result
provides a possible explanation as to why too oten most
funds present a poor performance, especially for long-term
investment horizons.
Example 1 (continued). In our example, we consider an
investment horizon of � = 40 and we use as a risk measure
the 10%-percentile; that is, � = 10% and thereby �� = −1.28.
With � = 50% invested in stocks and no administrative costs
the rate of return is � = 5.5%. Assuming administrative costs
of ] = 0.1%, recall that Δ
]
= 2.38% and then we ind that� − �
]
= 0.1%, and so the reduction in the rate of return is0.1%.
Using the Taylor expansion we have
� − �
]
≈ ]��, (22)
where � = 1.9744. hus, the irst-order rate of return is
reduced by an amount that is equivalent to about twice
the administrative costs (�] = 0.05%). We examined the
precision of the irst-order approximation in our example, the
details of which are provided in Appendix B.
Belowwe consider the twomain reasons why administra-
tive fees constitute a burden to the investor. First, we analyze
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Table 1: Opportunity cost of administrative costs (�) for selected combinations of parameter values (� = 10%, � = 40).
Fund � � � ] � �
Example 1 4% 8% 0.2 0.1% 50% ∈ (0%, 97.5%)∗ 1.974
Low volatility 4% 7% 0.16 0.1% 50% ∈ (0%, 113.3%)∗ 2.130
Medium volatility
Pessimistic 4% 8.5% 0.25 1.1% 50% ∈ (0%, 54.4%)∗ 1.373
Breakeven 4% 9.5% 0.25 1.1% 50% ∈ (6.9%, 70.4%)∗ 1.883
Optimistic 4% 10.5% 0.25 1.1% 50% ∈ (22.9%, 86.4%)∗ 2.996
High volatility
Pessimistic 4% 17.5% 0.75 3.1% 8.31% ∈ (0%, 18.5%)∗ 2.385
Breakeven 4% 20.5% 0.75 3.1% 10.49% ∈ (2.3%, 23.8%)∗ 3.305
Optimistic 4% 23.5% 0.75 3.1% 13.67% ∈ (7.6%, 29.2%)∗ 4.487
∗
he interval indicates the domain for parameter � according to the conditions in Section 3.2.
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Figure 3: he plot shows � as a function of � (a) and � (b) in our example. Parameters are � = 4%, � = 8%, � = 20%, ] = 0.1%, � = 10%, and� = 50% (a) and � = 40 (b).
the impact of administrative costs on the reduction in the
rate of return, �, as a function of time. Second, we present
the dependence of the opportunity costs on the proportion
invested in stocks. Figure 3(a), which presents � as a function
of time, shows that while the impact increases, it is not
very great in the irst few years of the investment; however,
the reduction in the rate of return increases substantially
in the long term. Figure 3(b) shows that as the percentage
invested in stocks rises, the relative reduction or the cost of
opportunity becomes smaller.
6. Illustrations
In this section we consider three possible standard scenarios
for generic investment products. We assume diferent sce-
narios governing the mean and variance in market returns.
(In practice, similar scenarios can be found in passive invest-
ment, active investment mutual funds, and hedge funds.)he
model and methodology used for the approximations of the
impact of administrative costs are the same for each scenario.
Parameter values for the selected scenarios are presented
in Table 1.We begin our illustrations with a standard scenario
characterized by low volatility (� = 0.16) in the returns. If
volatility is onlymoderate, themean level of stock investment
return is usually also quite low.We assume very low adminis-
trative fees in this case. Next, we examine a situation in which
expected returns are higher, as are administrative costs. We
distinguish three possible medium volatility scenarios (� =0.25) in this case, as described in Table 1. Finally, we examine
the impact of administrative costs on investments under an
assumption of high volatility (� = 0.75). Here volatility is
much higher than in the previous scenarios and expected
returns are also higher, even though the proportion invested
in stocks in this example is considerably smaller than that
in the previous two cases. Administrative costs in this high
volatility scenario are also higher than the fees charged in the
low and medium volatility scenarios.
Our aim is to assess the impact of administrative costs
in terms of the reduction in the rate of return and to do
this we measure the multiplier � in (20). he last column
he Scientiic World Journal 7
0 20 40 60 80 100
1
2
3
4
5
6
t
�
(a)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
2
4
6
8
10
12
�
�
(b)
Figure 4: Low volatility of returns. he plot shows � as a function of � with � = 50% (a) and � as a function of � with � = 40 (b). Parameters
are � = 4%, � = 7%, � = 16%, ] = 0.1%, and � = 10%.
in Table 1 presents the � values for each set of parameter
cases. It can be seen that � > 1 in all cases, oten around 2
and sometimes even much higher. he reduction in the rate
of return due to the presence of administrative costs (�]) is
roughly twice (� ≈ 2) the amount of these costs in the � = 40
year horizon for the low volatility and the medium volatility
scenarios. For optimistic medium volatility investments in
the high volatility scenario considered here, the reduction in
the rate of return is much higher than twice the amount of
administrative costs.
In the next section we discuss the evolution in � as a
function of time and in � as a function of �. To simplify
the presentation, we select a maximum time horizon of one
hundred years. he size of � shows the enormous burden of
administrative costs due to the cost of opportunity.
6.1. Low Volatility. In the irst scenario, we consider low
volatility as described in Table 1. Figure 4 presents the evo-
lution of � as a function of time and � as a function of �.
For this case we observe that the opportunity cost due to
the presence of administrative costs is well above 1 when the
proportion invested in stocks is low. Figure 4(b) shows that
if the proportion invested in stocks is less than 20%, then� is above 4, so the opportunity cost increases more than
threefold in a time horizon of 40 years. Figure 4(a) shows that
long-term investment horizons only exacerbate the situation,
since � keeps growing with time. It might be argued that,
in our choice of parameters for a standard, low volatility
investment of low expected returns, administrative costs are
also low and so the opportunity cost is not relevant. However,
this conclusion is drawn on relative terms and the costs can
be muchmore signiicant in absolute terms or in real wealth.
6.2.MediumVolatility. Wealso considered a scenario charac-
terized bymediumvolatility andmediumadministrative fees.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 present the evolution of � as a function of
time and � as a function of �. We irst consider a pessimistic
scenario inwhich the expected returns on investment are low,
yet higher than in the case of low volatility. he impact of
administrative costs is expected to be similar to that in the
low volatility investment case, because even if volatility is now
higher, the mean return is also higher. We observe that the
impact of administrative costs (�) in the medium volatility
case is now lower than it was in the low volatility case. he
impact in terms of the return lost due to administrative costs
is roughly the same in the breakeven case as in that of the
low volatility investment. But the optimistic scenario gives a
much worse result than that of the low volatility situation.
It should be noted in Figure 5(b) that the proportion of
wealth invested in stocks cannot be very large in this scenario
if we want to be able to ind the risk-adjusted equivalent
in the presence of administrative costs. his means that if� becomes larger than the values shown, we ind ourselves
outside the parameter space and cannot calculate our risk-
adjusted measure of lost return.
As we proceed to the high volatility scenario, Figures 6
and 7, we observe that � has a larger range but that the impact
of administrative costs is also much higher here than in the
pessimistic case, especially if � is low. In the most optimistic
medium volatility scenario considered here, Figure 7, it can
be seen that the time horizon should not exceed much more
than eighty years; otherwise we can expect an enormous
increase in � due to time persistence.
6.3. HighVolatility. Long-term investments with high volatil-
ity typically also have high expected returns and, in general,
incur high administrative fees. Figures 8, 9, and 10 present
the evolution of � as a function of time and � as a function of� in the high volatility scenarios. In Table 1, where we have
initially ixed � = 40 and a quantile probability equal to10%, we see that for a high volatility investment we obtain
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Figure 5: Medium volatility of returns (pessimistic).he plot shows � as a function of �with � = 50% (a) and � as a function of �with � = 40
(b). Parameters are � = 4%, � = 8.5%, � = 25%, ] = 1.1%, and � = 10%.
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Figure 6: Medium volatility of returns (breakeven). he plot shows � as a function of � with � = 50% (a) and � as a function of � with � = 40
(b). Parameters are � = 4%, � = 9.5%, � = 25%, ] = 1.1%, and � = 10%.
the highest value of �, namely, 4.487 for the optimistic case.
In Figures 9(a) and 10(a) it can be seen that the value of �
tends to ininity as � approaches 80 and 66, respectively,
which means that the impact of administrative costs on the
reduction in the rate of return is extreme at that boundary.
In high volatility scenarios, the parameter space is fairly
restrictive for the values of �, that is, the proportion invested
in stocks, in order to ind the risk-adjusted lost return due
to administrative costs. Again our results indicate that the
impact of administrative costs, even if the excess returns(� − �) are large, is substantial when the volatility is
high.
7. Concluding Remarks
Here we have highlighted the substantial impact adminis-
trative costs can have on investment plans with long-term
horizons. On the understanding that an analysis limited to
expected returns cannot provide a risk-adjusted evaluation of
the rate of return that is lost as a result of administrative costs,
we propose a one-stepmethod to approximate the size of their
impact. We illustrate our method with examples of realistic,
standard fund types and, in many plausible scenarios, we
oten ind the multiplier to be well above one, indicating that
the impact of administrative fees is much greater than their
actual size.
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Figure 7: Medium volatility of returns (optimistic). he plot shows � as a function of � with � = 50% (a) and � as a function of � with � = 40
(b). Parameters are � = 4%, � = 10.5%, � = 25%, ] = 1.1%, and � = 10%.
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Figure 8: High volatility of returns (pessimistic). he plot shows � as a function of � with � = 50% (a) and � as a function of � with � = 40
(b). Parameters are � = 4%, � = 17.5%, � = 75%, ] = 3.1%, and � = 10%.
Our indings regarding the diference in the rate of return
when introducing moderate administrative costs are much
greater than expected; and it is our belief that this accounts
for the poor performance of many common fund types.
If administrative costs are ixed and are not dependent on
performance, then they can be so highly detrimental to the
long-term return that the investor is trapped in a clearly
suboptimal investment strategy.
he simple approximation of the risk-adjusted impact can
be used to show investors the importance of administrative
costs and is a relevant contribution of this study in its own
right. he only requirements to make this estimation are the
time horizon, the volatility estimates, the excess returns, and
the proportion of wealth invested in stocks.
Finally, in highly realistic scenarios, we have shown that
the impact of administrative costs in terms of the approximate
lost rate of return is oten twice the amount of these adminis-
trative fees. his is particularly disturbing for those investing
in pensions. We believe that our contribution can provide
greater insights into the analysis of administrative costs and
change perspectives regarding the information supplied by
intermediarieswhen communicating to investors the possible
impact of administrative fees. Underestimating the efects on
lost returns is potentially very high, especially if investors
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Figure 9: High volatility of returns (breakeven). he plot shows � as a function of � with � = 50% (a) and � as a function of � with � = 40
(b). Parameters are � = 4%, � = 20.5%, � = 75%, ] = 3.1%, and � = 10%.
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Figure 10: High volatility of returns (optimistic). he plot shows � as a function of � with � = 50% (a) and � as a function of � with � = 40
(b). Parameters are � = 4%, � = 23.5%, � = 75%, ] = 3.1%, and � = 10%.
erroneously believe the lost rate of return to be exactly equal
to the administrative costs.
Appendices
A. Conditions on the Parameters
Our parameter space is deined by two conditions, to which
we add one additional restriction that is required in the next
section.
Condition 1. We assume that
0 ≤ ] ≤ −���√� . (A.1)
On one hand, we assume that administrative costs cannot
be negative; on the other, we require a maximum bound
for administrative costs in order to be able to control the
risk-return relationship. Parameter ��, which denotes the �-
percentile of a standard normal distribution, tends to −∞
when � tends to 0. he right-hand inequality of Condition
1 will always be satisied if we consider a quantile probability
level � that is suiciently small, so in practice we can admit all
values for nonnegative administrative costs, ], provided we
work with a suitable tolerance or quantile (probability) level.
It follows from (A.1) that max(0, (((� − �) + ���)/√�)/�2) ≤((�−�−])/�2) and thenwe can establish the second condition
in our parameter space.
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]
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expansions superimposed. Parameters are � = 4%,� = 8%,� = 20%,� = 10%, � = 50%, and � = 40.
Condition 2. Consider
max(0, (� − �) + ���/√��2 ) ≤ � ≤
(� − � − ])
�2 . (A.2)
he boundaries in (A.2) are consistent as a result of (A.1).
he lower bound for Condition 2 indicates that the median
of the wealth process increases as the proportion invested in
stocks increases. Equivalently, we want (5) to be an increasing
function of �. he upper bound in Condition 2 follows from
the fact that the quantile decreases when � increases, so that
more wealth can be lost if a larger proportion is invested in
stocks. hus, we impose (4) as a decreasing function of �.
Condition 2 has a consequence for the time horizon
for investors. (his bound is also useful when examining
our irst-order approximation to quantify the impact of
administrative costs.) It readily follows from (A.2) that the
investment time horizon cannot be ininitely long; that is,
� ≤ [ ���(� − � − ��2)]
2. (A.3)
In order to be able to compare the quantiles of terminal
wealth for the case involving no administrative costs (] = 0)
with those for the case with administrative costs and lower �,
we need an additional condition to hold.
Condition 3. Consider
2�]�2 ≤ [
(� − � − ]) + ���/√��2 − �]
2
. (A.4)
B. First-Order Approximation Accuracy
In our example, we use the capital market parameters � = 4%,� = 8%, and � = 20%, which are similar to those used by
other authors, including, for example, [32].
To assess the quality of the Taylor expansion, Figure 11
shows Δ
]
as a function of ] with the irst- and second-
order Taylor expansions superimposed. It can be seen that the
second-order Taylor expansion provides very exact approxi-
mations for the values of ] considered here, while the irst-
order expansion is very exact for ] < 0.20% in our set of
parameters.
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